Maurer School of Law: Indiana University

Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty

Faculty Scholarship

1952

Book Review. Pound, Roscoe, Justice According to Law
Ralph F. Fuchs
Indiana University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Jurisprudence Commons, and the Legal History Commons

Recommended Citation
Fuchs, Ralph F., "Book Review. Pound, Roscoe, Justice According to Law" (1952). Articles by Maurer
Faculty. 1628.
https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/1628

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open
access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles
by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information,
please contact rvaughan@indiana.edu.

BOOK REVIEWS
JUSTICE ACCORDING TO LAW. By Roscoe Pound. Yale University Press, 1951. Pp. 98.
In this slim volume, containing 91 pages of text, Dean Pound again
summarizes many of his jurisprudential views, which have become so
famous and influential throughout the world. The three parts were delivered as lectures at Westminster College in the series which was brought
to public attention by Winston Churchill's momentous pronouncement in
1946, after President Truman had introduced him. The book is, therefore,
intended primarily for lay readers. It may be doubted whether the lectures
were understood by Dean Pound's listeners or whether the book will serve
its intended purpose; for the text is loaded with unexplained technical
references and allusions to facts of legal history, such as the layman can
hardly be expected to comprehend. Its organization, moreover, is complex
and not easy to follow. For the lawyer, however, "the impression of the
purposes, method, and problems of the administration of justice according to law" which the author has "sought to impart" I is significant and
worth the effort of close reading; for here are distilled the thoughts, "derived
from 60 years of practice and teaching of law, .

.

. unburdened with

. . . accumulated detailed information"-the fruit of a distinguished,
scholarly career.
Across these pages march many of the Poundian categories, classifications, insights and attitudes which have become familiar to readers of the
author's previous writings. Philosophical jurists, metaphysical jurisprudence, 19th-century historical jurists, neo-Hegelians, Comptian positivism,
neo-realists and other categories of individuals and of thought are mentioned. Numerous precise classifications appear. "Right as a noun has
five meanings. Law is used in at least five." "Morals has two." (P. 2)
"There are four theoretical possibilities" with relation to the place of law
in social control. (P. 32) "Three things have operated" to make the question "What is law?" a difficult one. One is the need of balance between
rule and discretion. "Another is that there are at least four points of view
from which law in the sense of a body of authoritative precepts may be
looked at. . . ." "A Third is that three quite different things have gone
by the name of law as used by lawyers. . . ." (P. 43) "Rules, principles,

precepts defining legal concepts and precepts prescribing standards" (P. 56)
make up the total body of authoritative precepts. In the application of
standards and choice of competing concepts and principles, "a received
picture of a pioneer, rural, agricultural society" has been yielding to "a
picture of the urban, industrial society of today." (Pp. 55-56) The
"taught tradition of experience developed by reason and reason tested by
experience" is the essence of the common law technique. (P. 60) Unnamed individuals "in our law schools today . . . advocate a complete

fusion of legislative, executive and judicial power in administrative boards
1. Foreword.
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and bureaus and agencies," (P. 79) even "administrative absolutism."
(Pp. 81-83) Contemporary society is characterized by "new expectations
. which bring about new conflicts." (P. 17) An example is the
claim advanced by "students who belong to racial groups" in "one of the
great universities of the land," who "assert what they consider a reasonable
expectation of being chosen by socially prominent societies" and have
generated "a heated controversy" with those who assert the "claim to choose
agreeable associates to live with them." (Pp. 17-18)
Dean Pound's book starts with a discussion of the meaning of justice
in the various senses of the word. The principal conflict of meaning with
which the text deals is that between "the actual social order and the normal
expectations to which it gives rise . . . as the final determinative of

rights" and, by contrast, ideals which serve as determinants regardless of
previous legal acceptance, such as those of liberty and equality. (P. 5)
"On the one hand, justice is thought of as respect for the expectations
involved in civilized life as we know it in the time and place. On the other
hand, it may be thought of as respect for the expectations involved in life
in a society in which every human being may live a full and equal social
and economic existence." (P. 6) The former is denominated, in Aristotelian terms, "commutative justice"; the latter is known as "distributive
justice." The former should be the guide for the courts, with flexibility
provided by the opportunity to use discretion in applying standards; the
latter is the business of legislatures. (P. 9) Confusion between them has
arisen in recent times, according to Dean Pound; for courts have been
urged to distort their function of applying principles of commutative justice
so as to bring about distributive justice-e.g., by placing the burden of
loss in various situations on persons most able to bear it, rather than on
those responsible. To some extent the courts have responded. This process
in the example given leads, however, into a morass when business enterprise is involved; for "the bureau organization of the service state today"
manipulates price, rate, and other controls in such a manner as to render
the actual economic outcome of a particular judicially-devised loss distribution highly doubtful. (Pp. 12-13) In any event there are many situations
where no ideal "guide to solution" of particular conflicts is possible because
claimants of equal standing advance competing demands. At least in such
circumstances, "we must have positive law or go back to private war."
(Pp. 15-16)
Dean Pound, however, does not surrender to cynicism because ideals
cannot solve all problems. He expresses his dislike for surrender to any
"give-it-up philosophy." (P. 23) If it is not possible to rely in the first
instance or sweepingly on ideal justice in determining legal rights and
duties, it is possible to continue, as law has all along, to "adjust relations
and order conduct so as to give the most effect to the whole scheme of expectations of men in civilized society with a minimum of friction and
waste." (P. 29) Such a process does not ignore or reject ideals, but seeks
rather to realize existent ideals to the maximum extent. It has "taught
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us how to go far toward achieving a practical task of enabling men to live
together in politically organized communities in civilized society." (P. 29)
Thus the author asserts the pragmatic philosophy which, as respects operations rather than aims, unites men of differing ideals and purposes in a continuing order and, in the process, develops the aim of maximum satisfaction
of human wants as a purpose transcending others.
Turning to the meaning of law, as distinguished from justice which
is the end of law, Dean Pound deals initially with the "body of authoritative
grounds of our guides to decision." (P. 32) Law in this sense may be
viewed from the points of view of the lawmaker, of the individual subject
to law, of the judge called upon to decide a controversy, and of the counsellor or legal adviser. These four standpoints "can be unified . . . from
the standpoint of the judge"; (Pp. 4345) for judicial decisions serve to
define legislative commands, to guide individual conduct, and to afford a
basis for the counsellor's predictions. Nevertheless, the law behind judicial
decisions "is something actual"; it is not "a pretense cloaking what is done
by officials." (P. 39) Here, of course, Dean Pound does battle with those
who assert that law is simply actual decisions in particular cases, influenced
largely by judicial background and temperament. He points to an example
of agreement among judges despite polar differences of experience and
personality. (Pp. 37-39) The true conception of law embraces legal
precepts, the technique of developing and applying them, and the "received, authoritative ideals" which guide judicial choices when new situations must be dealt with. (Pp. 50-61) To the "self-styled realists" in law
who, like those in art, emphasize what is ugly because of fondness for it,
(P. 90) Dean Pound concedes only that emphasis upon the "personal, subjective, arbitrary element" in adjudication is "not without some warrant
in what has been happening recently in a few courts" 2 and that "we have
always known that the judicial process does not at all times and in all
places conform absolutely and in all respects to our ideal of it." (P. 91)
In the concluding part of the book Dean Pound, dealing with judicial
justice, pays his respects once more to its antithesis, "administrative
absolutism." (P. 73) He rejects as illusory six alleged checks upon the
administrative process which, operating with "a complete fusion of legislative, executive and judicial power in administrative boards and bureaus
and agencies," is not subject to the "numerous and effective checks" that
inhere in "judicial justice." (P. 79) Dean Pound points once more to
"certain general and persistent tendencies of administrative agencies" which
he has identified as dangerous in previous writings.3 Here they are four,
in contrast to larger numbers sometimes specified previously: the "tendency
to decide without a hearing"; the "tendency to make determinations on the
basis of consultations with witnesses in private or of reports not divulged,
2. P. 36. Dean- Pound does not exclude the Supreme Court of the United

States from among the courts that might be considered as falling within this
stricture.
3. Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 63 A.B.A. REP.

331, 346-351 (1938); PouND, AmIsNITRATIm
the "Minority Report," 27 A.B.A.J. 664 (1941).

LAW

67-74 (1942); Pound, For

166

UNIVERSITY OP PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 101

giving the party affected no opportunity to refute or explain"; the "tendency
to make determinations injuriously affecting individual rights without a
basis in evidence of rational probative force"; and the tendency "to set up
and give effect to policies beyond or even at variance with the statutes or
the general law governing . . . the administrative agency."

Dean Pound does himself no credit by repeating these generalizations
which at most reflect occasional abuses in a vast aggregate of administrative
proceedings he has never made a detailed effort to appraise.4 However the
Dean, opposed as he is to "the service state as an omnicompetent agency
of perfecting society," (P. 83) recognizes that there was need for the development of administrative agencies and of resort to official discretion as a
reaction from the "completeness with which executive action was tied down
by legal liability and judicial review" in the nineteenth century and from
the tendency "to commit to courts matters of administration which were
properly executive." (Pp. 71-72) He is "not preaching against administrative agencies in themselves." 5 His plea comes down to one for adequate review of administrative action by the judiciary. In pointing out the
merits of "judicial justice" he idealizes it. "Mechanical jurisprudence,"
which once marred the work of the courts, "has disappeared." (P. 85)
Judicial justice "provides for certainty" by "logical development and systematic exposition of authoritative materials"; it "provides for growth by
permitting a scientific testing" of received materials in new applications.
(Pp. 87-88) "Judges will on the whole uphold the law against excitement
and clamor." (P. 89) The last word in applying the law should go to
them.
What shall we say of this summary of the study and thought of a
brilliant and versatile scholar? Not, surely, that it contains the imposing
philosophy that might have been based upon a foundation so broad and
so filled with enduring substance. Here, for example, is little trace of the
results of the Cleveland Crime Survey or of the author's inquiries into
judicial administration. 6 The wisdom and the insights are marred by
strong prejudices and inadequately based generalizations. The conception
of law which is adopted seems, moreover, to be inadequate for an age in
which legislation plays so large a role in legal development; for Dean
Pound, while recognizing the importance of legislation, considers it an element in the scheme of social control bearing on law and supplying some
of its precepts, but scarcely forming part of the legal system. Hence the
forces which work through legislation and the interaction between legislative and judicial development of law are undiscussed: But Dean Pound's
4. See Jaffe, Invective and Investigation in Administrative Law, 52 HAuv. L.
REv. 1201, 1232-1236 (1939); Davis, Dean Pound and Administrative Law, 42 Cot.
L. REv. 89 (1942). Both Jaffe and Davis have demolished much of the meager
evidence adduced in support of the generalizations. See further Bailey, Dean Pound
and Administrative Law-Another View, 42 Co.. L. REv. 781 (1942); Davis, Dean
Poun 's Errors about Administrative Agencies, 42 CoT. L. REV. 804 (1942).
5. P. 78. The author's somewhat divergent views concerning administrative
agencies reflect an old tendency to self-contradiction which Jerome Frank once
tellingly exposed. FRANK, IF MEN W=a ANGELS 332-343 (1942).
6. See POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS (1940).
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contributions are here too. The analyses and classifications he has given
are of enduring value. More important, his pragmatic conception of the
operation and purpose of law continues to possess major significance. In
keeping with the typical American approach to social problems, it needs
reassertion in a time when the authoritarian challenge to it, at home and
abroad, displays new strength. Finally, there is need in an age of cynicism
for Dean Pound's unabated insistence upon the importance of ideals and
his assertion that "striving for the ideal . . . goes far to realize the
ideal." (P. 91) There is need, too, in a time when harassed officials
assert unlimited executive power over the property and lives of individuals,
in emergencies determined by the Chief Executive, for reiteration of the
philosophy that law is not simply administrative efficiency and convenience.
Attention to the fundamentals of a system of law, such as Dean Pound
insists upon demanding of the legal profession and of the public, continues
to be indispensable.
Ralph F. Fuchs t

BOOKS NOTED
Papers and addresses of Learned Hand, collected, and with an Introduction and Notes by Irving Dilliard. New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952. Pp. 262. $3.50.

THE SPIIT OF LIBERTY.

In truth, this is Learned Hand's book, and Mr. Dilliard, who compiled
it, would have no objection to this observation. The very general concession that as a man of letters, wisdom and insight, Learned Hand has few
peers, magnifies one's amazement to find that the records of the Library
of Congress reveal no book authored by him. Mr. Dilliard's introduction
indicates that this fact motivated the publication of the Spirit of Liberty,
which is a collection of speeches, letters and articles written by Judge Hand
over a period of some fifty-eight years. The articles cover a wide range
of subjects including democracy, justice, tolerance, liberty, public morals
and ultimate values; and some are commentaries on such men as Brandeis,
Cardozo, Hughes, Holmes and Stone. The variety of occasions which
prompted the writing of these thirty-four articles, and the span of years
between the preparation of the first and last article endow the collection
with a peculiar quality for reflecting a more or less complete picture of the
author. Any part of the picture of the man, Learned Hand, left unmirrored
in his own writings, Mr. Dilliard has endeavored to supply in his Introduction and Notes.
The last of the pieces appearing in the book is a speech delivered at
the annual dinner of the Harvard Club of New York on January 18, 1952.
Of this speech judge Hand wrote to Mr. Dilliard: "There is only this to
say about this speech. It does more completely represent my views on
ultimate values than anything else I have written-at least I think soand it is probably the last time I shall put them out with the same detail."
For the reading of this article alone, the book could be highly recommended.
'IProfessor of Law, University of Indiana.

